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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 This matter is before this court on appeal by Delaware 
County Community College from orders denying its motions for  
judgment as a matter of law and on a cross-appeal by Frank 
McDaniels from orders dismissing the trustees of the college as 
  
defendants and denying him a new trial on non-economic damages.  
The case arose as a result of McDaniels' discharge as a tenured 
professor at the college.   
 We describe the unusual procedural background of the 
case at length.1  On February 13, 1992, McDaniels filed this 
action in the district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the 
college's Board of Trustees, individually and in their official 
capacity, and against the college.  He charged that the 
defendants, in terminating his employment by reason of certain 
serious charges of misconduct made against him by a student at 
the college, violated his procedural due process rights under the 
United States Constitution.  The student later was identified as 
John Federici. 
 In March 1992, the college filed a motion for summary 
judgment, which the district court denied without opinion.  The 
college then unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration.  In 
denying that motion, the district court explained that there was 
an issue of material fact as to whether McDaniels received notice 
of the charges or the purpose of the pretermination meeting 
before the meeting and whether he was informed of the specific 
accusations during the meeting.   
                     
1
.  The college also appeals from the denial of pretrial motions 
for summary judgment.  In response McDaniels contends that in 
view of the verdict at the trial we cannot entertain the appeal 
from the denial of these motions.  We do not address this point, 
however, for our conclusion that the college was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law renders it moot. 
  
 After discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment.  
The court granted partial summary judgment on liability to 
McDaniels and thus denied the college's motion.  On January 27, 
1994, it started a jury trial on damages but, after hearing 
McDaniels' testimony, the court determined that there was a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether there had been a procedural 
due process violation.  In a subsequent memorandum opinion 
explaining its reasoning, the court noted that actions taken 
after the pretermination meeting might show that McDaniels was 
aware of the specific charges and that he had an opportunity to 
respond to them.  Consequently, the court concluded that it had 
granted McDaniels partial summary judgment improvidently.  The 
court therefore offered McDaniels a choice between proceeding 
with the trial and proving liability as well as damages, or 
having the court declare a mistrial.  McDaniels elected to have 
the court declare a mistrial.  In a subsequent written opinion 
explaining why it had reached the foregoing conclusions, the 
court included a footnote stating that the trustees had been 
dismissed as defendants "sua sponte and without objection" 
because they had nothing to do with the pretermination events 
leading up to McDaniels' discharge.    
 The court divided the second trial into three separate 
sub-trials, which we shall call phases, with the first phase 
focusing on liability.  At the close of McDaniel's case on this 
phase, which was also the close of all of the evidence as the 
college did not call any witnesses, both McDaniels and the 
college unsuccessfully moved for judgment as a matter of law 
  
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).  Then in response to specific 
questions, the jury returned a verdict that:  (1) the college 
adequately notified McDaniels that the November 27, 1991 meeting 
was a pretermination hearing on Federici's sexual harassment 
charges; (2) the college informed McDaniels of the substance of 
the case against him during that meeting; but (3) McDaniels was 
not given a meaningful opportunity to respond and tell his side 
of the story.  App. 1214-15.  In view of the third finding, the 
college could be liable.  In the second phase the jury determined 
that if McDaniels had been given an adequate opportunity to 
respond, the college would not have terminated his employment, 
presuming that it would have acted fairly and reasonably.  App. 
2171.  Based on this verdict, the court entered an order 
reinstating McDaniels on the faculty and awarding him $134,081 in 
lost wages.  Finally, in the third phase the jury found that 
McDaniels was not entitled to damages for non-economic harm.  The 
court, nevertheless, awarded him one dollar on that claim for 
nominal damages.  App. 2333. 
 The college then moved for judgment as a matter of law 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).  McDaniels filed a "conditional" 
post-trial motion for a new trial on the issue of damages.  In 
opposing the college's motion, McDaniels contended that it was 
estopped from moving for judgment as a matter of law because the 
college's attorney in his closing argument at the third phase led 
the jury to believe that the college agreed to "make peace" with 
McDaniels and make him whole.  The court, though not estopping 
the college, denied the post-trial motions on August 22, 1994.  
  
The college then filed a notice of appeal, and McDaniels filed a 
notice of cross-appeal. 
 Thereafter, McDaniels moved in this court to dismiss 
the appeal and cross-appeal on the basis of the statements the 
college's attorney made during closing argument at the third 
phase.  Essentially he contends, as he did in the district court, 
that the statements estop the college from seeking post-trial 
remedies.  After he filed that motion in this court, the district 
court issued a memorandum opinion explaining the reason for its 
disposition of the post-trial motions, including why it had 
rejected McDaniels' judicial estoppel argument.  We now deny the 
motion to dismiss the appeal and cross-appeal as we agree with 
the district court that the college's attorney's comments should 
not estop it from pursuing post-trial remedies. 
 On appeal, the college argues that the district court 
should have granted its motions for judgment as a matter of law.  
McDaniels cross-appeals from the district court's dismissal of 
his case against the individual defendants and from the denial of 
his post-trial motion for a new trial on non-economic damages.  
We will reverse on the college's appeal from the denial of its 
post-trial motion for judgment, will affirm on McDaniels' cross-
appeal challenging the dismissal of the trustees, and will not 
reach McDaniels' argument seeking a new trial on non-economic 
damages. 
 
 II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
  
 We set forth the facts, many of which are not in 
dispute, viewing them in a light most favorable to McDaniels.2  
McDaniels was a tenured professor at the college which is a 
public institution in Delaware County, Pennsylvania.  In 1990, 
the college received complaints from two male students that 
McDaniels sexually harassed them.  App. 1075-80.  After 
investigating the reports, the college sent McDaniels a letter 
informing him that he had violated the school's sexual harassment 
policy.  App. 1029-30.  The letter warned McDaniels that 
"reoccurrence of such incidents will result in serious 
disciplinary action including termination of employment."  App. 
1030.  McDaniels responded to these charges in writing and signed 
the college's letter to acknowledge that he had reviewed its 
contents.  App. 1030-31, 1075-80. 
 In the summer of 1991, McDaniels taught a marketing 
class at the college.  John Federici, who was one of the students 
in the class, had trouble with the course work and sought help 
from McDaniels.  Due to various problems, including a final term 
paper that Federici handed in late, McDaniels gave him a "D" for 
the course.3  App. 938.  Federici needed at least a "C" in the 
course to transfer the credit for it toward a nearly completed 
degree from Pennsylvania State University.  App. 746.  According 
                     
2
.  We are generous to McDaniels in so viewing the facts because 
the college was the verdict winner at the first phase except on 
the third issue. 
3
.  McDaniels first gave Federici a grade of "Incomplete."  App. 
935.   
  
to McDaniels, Federici became irate and threatened to get him.  
App. 1017.  McDaniels reported the incident to Assistant Dean 
Henry Jackson, McDaniels' supervisor at the time.  App. 1017. 
 Federici also approached Jackson and complained that he 
disagreed with McDaniels' grading of his term paper.  App. 934-
36.  Jackson contacted McDaniels after learning that Federici 
already had confronted McDaniels about the grade.  App. 936-38.  
McDaniels told him that the term paper was not well done.  App. 
938.  Jackson did not read the term paper.  App. 947-49.  Jackson 
then told McDaniels that Federici apparently misunderstood and 
that Jackson would contact him and explain the situation to him.  
App. 938-39.  Jackson then called Federici, but when he could not 
make Federici understand McDaniels' position, he told Federici to 
contact McDaniels directly.  App. 939.  Federici refused, saying 
something to the effect of "I can't do that."  App. 939.  When 
Jackson pressed him, Federici said that he needed to talk to 
Jackson about another matter.  App. 939-40.  Federici told him 
that McDaniels "always wanted to counsel [him]" and "always 
wanted to see [him.]"  App. 940.  Federici also told him that 
McDaniels talked to him about "tough love."  App. 940-41.  
Jackson then asked if he was talking about sexual harassment.  
App. 941.  Federici said he was and Jackson told him to discuss 
the matter with James Bryan, the college's Director of Personnel 
Services.  App. 941. 
 On November 18, 1991, Federici met with Bryan.  App. 
736, 739.  Federici told Bryan that he needed credits to transfer 
to Pennsylvania State University for his degree; he had problems 
  
with McDaniels' class; he was seeing a counselor regarding 
anxiety and stress problems; and he had been involved in various 
incidents with McDaniels.  App. 736-47.  Bryan took notes of the 
conversation.  App. 739.  Bryan asked Federici to make a written 
statement regarding these allegations.  App. 754.  When Federici 
said that he would need help doing so, Bryan offered to compile 
his notes into a written statement for Federici to sign.  App. 
754.  After their talk, Bryan composed a summary from his notes 
which Federici later reviewed and signed.  App. 760-61.  The 
summary, in relevant part, reads as follow: 
  While in the library studying [John 
Federici] fell asleep & awoke to see [Frank 
McDaniels] who was massaging John's neck.  
John was taken by surprise & felt very 
strange that this would have happened.  After 
that incident, [McDaniels] came into the 
library more & more as if he was looking for 
John. 
 
  John was in the library on another 
occasion with his friend Tom & [McDaniels] 
came in to talk to them.  [McDaniels] seemed 
to keep looking at the 'lower half' of John's 
body while he spoke.  [McDaniels] did not 
make eye contact with John but continued to 
stare at his lower body.4 
 
  John made an appointment to speak [with 
McDaniels] in [McDaniels'] office about the 
added class work to improve his grade.  
[McDaniels] repeatedly said he wanted to help 
John & counsel him.  [McDaniels] asked if 
John had heard of tough love & John said no.  
With this, [McDaniels] proceed (sic) to say 
that he would help him & 'If I need to I will 
                     
4
.  Bryan testified that Federici also told him that after 
McDaniels left, Federici asked Tom if he noticed the way 
McDaniels was staring at him, to which Tom responded negatively 
and laughed.  App. 781. 
  
hug you, beat the crap out of you or put my 
penis in your mouth.'  [McDaniels] reached 
over & put both of his hands on John's face & 
seemed to be about to cry & said, 'I really 
want to help you.'  John backed away and was 
stunned to hear this. 
 
  Summer I ended & John got an 
'Incomplete' for his marketing course.  He 
reluctantly called [McDaniels] at [the 
college] to attempt to get the assignments 
necessary to get a grade for the course.  
[McDaniels] returned his call & made some 
'sexual innuendo' remarks.  [McDaniels] made 
an appointment to see John on campus.  John 
was reluctant but needed to get an assignment 
to remove the 'Incomplete.' 
 
  At the appointment [McDaniels] discussed 
make-up work & repeating the final exam but 
then went into another description of the 
tough love thing with another explicit 
reference to sexual matters.  [McDaniels] 
said to come back to his office later if he 
wanted to have help on matters external to 
class activities but if he did not return, 
[McDaniels] would know John didn't want help 
in these personal matters.  [McDaniels] also 
said John should not discuss this with anyone 
since he could loose (sic) his job.  
[McDaniels] said he would 'get him' if he 
mentioned their conversations to anyone.  
[McDaniels] left the clear impression that 
the two of them could go somewhere off-campus 
'in private' to work out these personal 
problems (sexual overtones were clear). 
 
App. 258-61 (testified to at app. 763).   
 After his meeting with Federici, Bryan verified that 
Federici was a student in McDaniels' marketing course.  He then 
alerted several officials at the college about the matter.  App. 
768-71.  In particular Bryan discussed the situation with Dean 
Thomas McNicholas and asked Dr. Lois Ann Craig to determine 
  
whether Federici had any record of unusual behavior.  App. 771-
72. 
 On November 27, 1991, Bryan contacted McDaniels and 
told him to meet him in Bryan's office at 2:30 p.m. that 
afternoon and to bring along his grade book.  App. 787-88.  Prior 
to the meeting, McDaniels met Bryan and inquired about the reason 
for it.  App. 788-90.  Bryan told him only that it was about a 
"student problem" and he gave him no other information about the 
meeting.  App. 788-90; 983.  The meeting was held as scheduled 
with McNicholas, Bryan, and McDaniels present.   
 At the start of the meeting, Bryan told McDaniels that 
a student had lodged a sexual harassment complaint against him 
and that he and McNicholas would recommend McDaniels' 
termination.  App. 791, 982-83.  McDaniels testified that upon 
hearing Bryan's opening statement, he was "shocked, dismayed, . . 
. thrown offguard."  App. 983.  Bryan testified that he then told 
McDaniels "that the purpose of the meeting was to understand what 
the charge was, to have an opportunity for me to relay to him 
what the charges were specifically and for him to have a chance 
to respond."  App. 791.  McNicholas, the only other person at 
this meeting, confirmed this statement.  App. 915-16.  McDaniels 
testified that he "did not comprehend" that Bryan said explicitly 
that it was to be a "pretermination hearing."  App. 1072.  
McDaniels explained, "Well, if they did say it, they said it in 
the same sentence whereby they said they were recommending my 
termination to the board of trustees.  If they did say it, they 
had blown my mind so bad at that point, they had disorganized me 
  
-- disoriented me so much that I didn't remember them saying it, 
if they did say it."  App. 1073.  Bryan and McNicholas also 
testified that Bryan told McDaniels that he could adjourn the 
meeting at any time.  App. 862, 916. 
 A few minutes into the meeting, Bryan informed 
McDaniels that Federici filed the complaint.  App. 792-93, 851, 
913-14, 1014.  McDaniels became very upset upon learning this and 
left the room.  App. 851, 914, 1014-18.  After trying to collect 
himself, he returned and "was a little bit better," but was 
"still in a total state of shock" and "[didn't] even know what 
[he] said."  App. 1018.  McDaniels told them that Federici had 
threatened earlier to "get" him.  App. 794, 853.  McDaniels told 
Bryan and McNicholas that Federici had emotional problems, 
Federici's parents were aware of this, and McDaniels had made 
Dean Jackson aware of this as well.  App. 794-95, 859-60, 918.  
Bryan and McNicholas recalled McDaniels as having said that he 
knew Federici's parents and had talked to them.  App. 794, 859.  
McDaniels testified, however, that "If I did say that, I was in 
panic," and that he did not know them, and meant to say that they 
must have known that Federici had emotional problems.  App. 1025-
26.  Bryan and McNicholas agreed to talk to Jackson and 
Federici's mother.  App. 865.  Bryan and McNicholas also 
testified that McDaniels asked them if he could save his job if 
he agreed to seek counselling.  App. 858.  
 During the pretermination hearing, Bryan discussed 
Federici's allegations but he did not read or show the written 
summary to McDaniels.  App. 802, 1018.  It is unclear whether 
  
Bryan described Federici's allegations in a direct manner.  
However, Bryan asked McDaniels several questions relating to 
them.  App. 1019-21.  Bryan asked whether McDaniels touched 
Federici's neck or face in the library.  App. 1019.  McDaniels 
responded that he had not, but might have, and recalled an 
incident in which Federici was sitting when he walked into the 
library and saw him.  App. 917, 1019-20.  Bryan asked whether 
McDaniels had stared at the lower part of Federici's body in the 
library, in the presence of another student.  App. 1020.  
McDaniels denied this.  App. 1020.  Bryan also asked whether 
McDaniels had talked to Federici about "tough love."  App. 854, 
915, 1020.  McDaniels said that Federici initiated that topic.  
App. 1020.  Bryan testified that he also asked McDaniels about 
the sexually explicit remark quoted by Federici and about the 
alleged warning by McDaniels for Federici to keep quiet about 
their conversations.  App. 854, 856.  McDaniels, however, denied 
that Bryan ever mentioned these two points.  Bryan also brought 
to McDaniels' attention his previous reprimand for sexual 
harassment, showing him the warning letter.  App. 856, 1029.  
McDaniels told Bryan and McNicholas that the sexual harassment 
allegations regarding Federici were not true.   
 Bryan and McNicholas testified that Bryan told 
McDaniels that he should contact Bryan if he thought of any other 
matters, and that he had available various options to deal with 
these charges under his collective bargaining agreement with the 
college, the college's sexual harassment policy, and the 
Pennsylvania Local Agency Law, including an appeal to the 
  
president of the college.  App. 861-63, 915.  McDaniels did not 
recall any of this.  App. 1091.    
 As agreed, Bryan contacted Federici's parents.  In 
particular Bryan had a telephone conversation with Federici's 
mother, who told him that she did not remember talking to 
McDaniels.  App. 797.  McNicholas met with Jackson and asked 
whether McDaniels had told him that Federici was "off the wall" 
or "crazy" and Jackson answered "no."  App. 920.   
 Subsequently, Bryan sent McDaniels a letter, dated 
December 4, 1991, informing him that Bryan had investigated the 
matter and would recommend that the Board of Trustees terminate 
McDaniels' employment for sexual harassment.  App. 804.  The 
letter also advised McDaniels of his post-termination rights: 
 As I mentioned during the pre-termination 
meeting last Wednesday, you may want to have 
the [Board of Trustees'] action heard through 
the grievance procedure as provided under the 
terms of the collective bargaining agreement 
or you may elect to have a hearing before a 
committee of the Board of Trustees. 
 
App. 246 (testified to at app. 803-04).  Bryan sent McDaniels 
another letter, dated December 9, 1991, which said briefly: 
  Consistent with procedures in Regulation 
63.03, page 12 of the College Policy Manual, 
I am writing to inform you that you may 
exercise your right to request a further 
review and investigation by the President of 
the College or his designee on the matter of 
the sexual harassment complaint lodged 
against you.  You have five (5) days to file 
this request. 
 
  Please phone me should you have any 
questions on this matter. 
 
  
App. 248 (testified to at app. 804, 1045). 
 McDaniels wrote to the college's president, Richard D. 
DeCosmo, on December 12, 1991, to request that DeCosmo 
investigate the sexual harassment charges.  App. 1051.  McDaniels 
indicated in the letter that he has "formally filed a grievance 
with the intent of going all the way through the grievance 
procedure (arbitration) & beyond to civil action to avoid 
termination."  App. 165, 2352-53 (testified to  at 1052-53).  
McDaniels testified, however, that at the time of the letter, he 
had not begun the grievance procedure but was only "looking into" 
it.  App. 1093-94.  McDaniels also wrote: 
  Enclosed is a chronologized transcript 
of my total contact with this student.  I 
emplor (sic) you to thoroughly investigate 
his alligations (sic) personally & overturn 
the termination decision. . . . 
 
  . . .  I would be most happy to visit 
you & go over cronology (sic) of contact with 
John Federici from first meeting to last 
confrontation spanning May 23, 1991 to 
October 22, 1991.  Every single meeting was 
for class business only. 
 
 After receiving this letter, DeCosmo reviewed the 
documents relating to this matter, and met with Bryan, 
McNicholas, and Jackson to review their investigations and 
findings.  App. 1126.  On December 18, 1991, DeCosmo wrote the 
following to McDaniels: 
 I am satisfied that there has been a thorough 
review of the matter in question.  I do not 
believe further review is necessary.  The 
recommendation to terminate your employment 
for violation of the College's sexual 
harassment policy will be presented to the 
  
Board of Trustees at their meeting on 
December 18. 
 
App. 250 (testified to at app. 1102). 
 At the Board of Trustees' meeting on December 18, 1991, 
the Board voted unanimously to terminate McDaniels' employment.  
McDaniels did not appeal to or ask for a hearing by the Board of 
Trustees.  Nor has he pursued the matter in state court.  
Instead, he began arbitration procedures as provided for by the 
collective bargaining agreement.  Before the parties completed 
selection of the arbitrators, however, McDaniels filed this 
action.  Consequently, the arbitration proceedings have been 
stayed pending its disposition. 
 
 III.  JURISDICTION 
 The district court had jurisdiction over this civil 
rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights).  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 over the final orders entered by the district 
court. 
 
 IV.  DISCUSSION 
 A.  Judgment as a Matter of Law 
 The college made a motion for judgment as a matter of 
law based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) at the close of McDaniels' 
case in the first phase, which was also at the close of all the 
evidence, and a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 50(b) after completion of all three phases.  The 
  
district court denied both motions, and the college appeals from 
both denials. 
 We exercise plenary review over the district court's 
denial of the college's motions for judgment as a matter of law 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) and 50(b).  Lightning Lube, 
Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993), sets forth 
the standard we follow when considering a defendant's motion for 
judgment as a matter of law: 
 Such a motion should be granted only if, 
viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the 
advantage of every fair and reasonable 
inference, there is insufficient evidence 
from which a jury reasonably could find 
liability.  In determining whether the 
evidence is sufficient to sustain liability, 
the court may not weigh the evidence, 
determine the credibility of witnesses, or 
substitute its version of the facts for the 
jury's version. 
 
Id. (citations omitted).  A review of the record leads us to 
conclude that the jury verdict to the extent unfavorable to the 
college at the first phase is not supported by legally sufficient 
evidence and that the college should have been granted a judgment 
as a matter of law.  
 The parties agree that the starting point of the 
resolution of this procedural due process dispute is Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487 (1985).  
In Loudermill, two discharged school district employees sued 
their former employers for deprivation of liberty and property 
interests without due process in the pretermination procedures.  
The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in 
  
dismissing the complaints.  The Court first confirmed that under 
applicable Ohio law, the plaintiffs had property rights in 
continued employment.  Id. at 538-39, 105 S.Ct. at 1491.  Then, 
in determining "what process is due," Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600 (1972), the Loudermill Court 
began with the long-standing precept that "[a]n essential 
principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, 
or property 'be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing 
appropriate to the nature of the case.'"  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 
542, 105 S.Ct. at 1493 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 656-57 (1950)).  The 
Court reiterated the settled rule that due process "requires 
'some kind of a hearing' prior to the discharge of an employee 
who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his 
employment."  Id. (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705 (1972); Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2698 (1972)).  The 
Court noted that one essential component of due process, was a 
pretermination opportunity to respond.  Id. 
 Having said that, the Court went on to point out that 
"the pretermination 'hearing,' though necessary, need not be 
elaborate."  Id. at 545, 105 S.Ct. at 1495.  Rather, "'[t]he 
formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, 
depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the 
nature of the subsequent proceedings.'"  Id. (quoting Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786 (1971)).  Thus, 
after balancing the interests of public employees and employers, 
  
the Court held that "[t]he tenured public employee is entitled to 
oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation 
of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his 
side of the story."  Id. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495.  The Court 
concluded that "all the process that is due is provided by a 
pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with post-
termination administrative procedures as provided by the Ohio 
statutes."  Id. at 547-48, 105 S.Ct. at 1496. 
 The parties agree that under Loudermill McDaniels had a 
constitutionally protectible property interest in continued 
employment as a tenured professor at the college.  Loudermill 
therefore provides the guidelines for "what process is due."  
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 481, 92 S.Ct. at 2600.  The 
question then is whether the college satisfied its obligations 
under these guidelines. 
 After the closing of the first phase of the trial, the 
district court charged the jury in relevant part: 
  Being a tenured professor at a community 
college he was a public employee with a 
property interest in his job.  The law is 
that such an employee is entitled to the 
notice of the charges against him, an 
explanation of the employer's evidence, and 
an opportunity to present his side of the 
story.  And this entire process is known as a 
pre-termination hearing. 
 
  The notice may be written or oral, that 
is spoken.  It need not be advance notice, 
that is a pre-hearing notification.  In other 
words, the notice of the charges may be given 
at the hearing itself.  The hearing can be 
informal . . . .  It is not required to be a 
full hearing before the final decision maker. 
 
  
 . . . 
 
  The employee need not be informed as to 
all of the evidence, but at least the 
substance of it.  He must be given the 
opportunity to respond to the charges, and 
for that opportunity to be meaningful he must 
know the substance of the case that the 
employer has against him.  This enables the 
employee to make any plausible arrangements 
that might prevent the termination. . . . 
 
  In deciding whether Mr. McDaniels was 
given the opportunity to respond, you may 
consider what you decide occurred at the 
meeting on November 27, 1991, and also what 
occurred thereafter, prior to his termination 
on December 18th.  If you decide that under 
all the circumstances that Mr. McDaniels was 
substantially unable to respond, either at 
the meeting or before December 18, and that 
his inability to do so was caused by the 
conduct of the college's representatives, 
then it could not be said that he had the 
opportunity to respond to the charges. 
 
App. 1200-03.  The jury found that the college, through Bryan, 
did notify McDaniels "that the meeting on November 27, 1991 was a 
pre-termination hearing based on the sexual harassment charges of 
John Federici;" at that meeting Bryan did inform McDaniels as to 
the substance of the case against him; but McDaniels was not 
given a meaningful opportunity to respond and tell his side of 
the story.  App. 1214-15. 
 On appeal, the college does not quarrel with the 
foregoing charge.  But McDaniels appears to argue that, as a 
tenured professor who had been teaching at the college for 20 
years, he deserved more protection than those set forth in 
Loudermill.  We disagree.  The Loudermill Court balanced the 
competing interests of the employer and the employee in deriving 
  
the pretermination requirements.  In determining whether the 
Loudermill standard should apply here, we must consider the 
interests of McDaniels versus those of the college and the 
students. 
 It is true that McDaniels has a property interest in 
his continued employment and perhaps a liberty interest in 
clearing his reputation of sexual harassment charges.  But 
McDaniels appears to argue that because he is a professor and has 
been at the college for 20 years, his property interest in  
continued employment is constitutionally greater than those held 
by the employees in Loudermill.  Yet he has not offered any basis 
on which we could or should distinguish reasonably between the 
interest of a tenured employee who has worked 20 years and the 
interest of one who has worked only one year for the same 
employer and we can conceive of no principled way to distinguish 
between the two.  Arguably, the interest in continued employment 
may be greater for younger employees who have started only 
recently because they have potentially more years of employment 
ahead. 
 McDaniels claims that "[u]nlike ordinary public 
employees, the rights of professors to teach, free from arbitrary 
discharge by administrators, implicates the societal value of 
academic freedom.  Tenure is the pillar upon which academic 
freedom rests."  Br. at 34.  Although this assertion may be true, 
it is not material in this case.  Inasmuch as the college did not 
discharge McDaniels in retaliation for his exercise of First 
Amendment rights, this case does not implicate free speech 
  
issues.  Indeed, in his complaint McDaniels does not refer to the 
First Amendment.  Rather, we are concerned with the minimum 
process due under the Constitution to protect property rights in 
public employment.   
 McDaniels also cites Skehan v. Board of Trustees of 
Bloomsburg State College, 669 F.2d 142, 152 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1048, 103 S.Ct. 468 (1982), for the proposition 
that college professors deserve more process than the run-of-the-
mill, Loudermill-type employee.  In Skehan, we adhered to our 
earlier decision in Chung v. Park, 514 F.2d 382 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 948, 96 S.Ct. 364 (1975), where we stated that 
pretermination safeguards due to tenured professors  
 
 may include: (1) written notice of the 
grounds for termination; (2) disclosure of 
the evidence supporting termination; (3) the 
right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses; (4) an opportunity to be heard in 
person and to present witnesses and 
documentary evidence; (5) a neutral and 
detached hearing body; and (6) a written 
statement by the fact finders as to the 
evidence relied upon. 
 
Chung, 514 F.2d at 386 (emphasis added).  Nevertheless, neither 
Skehan nor Chung announced that due process required all six of 
these steps in cases involving tenured professors.  In both 
cases, we did not reach that issue because the colleges provided 
all six.  And neither case based the listed due process 
safeguards on the distinguishing fact that the employees were 
professors and therefore were entitled to extra protection in the 
name of academic freedom.  In any event, both cases were decided 
  
before Loudermill.  Inasmuch as Loudermill sets the minimum due 
process pretermination requirements where state procedure also 
provides, as it does here, substantial post-termination 
safeguards, Loudermill defines the minimum due process 
requirements for this case.  We further note that in Skehan we 
did not even consider the post-termination remedies, if any, as 
later required by Loudermill.  And in Chung, although certain 
post-termination remedies were available, see 514 F.2d at 385 
n.3., we did not consider them in reaching our result.  In fact, 
we held that some of the six enumerated steps may be provided 
after termination, and decided that the professor was not 
entitled to a hearing prior to termination.  Id. at 387. 
   In considering the interests of the college, we note 
that it, as much as a professor, has a great interest in 
preserving its reputation.  Moreover, the college had adopted a 
policy of protecting its students from the types of behavior 
charged against McDaniels.  We also need to consider the 
interests of the alleged victim of the sexual harassment.  If the 
charges are well founded, the complainant should be protected 
against possible retaliation and threats. 
 In sum, we conclude that only the Loudermill 
pretermination requirements were required here.  We therefore 
find that the trial court's instructions that due process 
required the college to provide McDaniels with notice and 
explanation of the charges and an opportunity to respond were 
correct.  See, e.g., Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 
1064, 1077-78 (3d Cir. 1990) (suspension without pay also 
  
requires prior notice and hearing); Copeland v. Philadelphia 
Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1144-46 (3d Cir. 1988) (suspension 
complied with due process where interview was held which notified 
employee of charges, allowed him to explain, and notified him of 
suspension), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004, 109 S.Ct. 1636 (1989); 
Gniotek v. City of Philadelphia, 808 F.2d 241, 244 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(no advance notice of the pretermination hearing is required; 
"Notice is sufficient, (1) if it apprises the vulnerable party of 
the nature of the charges and general evidence against him, and 
(2) if it is timely under the particular circumstances of the 
case."), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1050, 107 S.Ct. 2183 (1987).  
 The college argues that McDaniels was given notice of 
the hearing and the charges against him, an adequate explanation 
of its evidence, and an adequate opportunity to present his side 
of the story.  The college points out that McDaniels had various 
post-termination remedies, including a hearing before the Board 
of Trustees, arbitration, and an appeal to the state court.  
Finally, the college argues that the verdict should be overturned 
because the jury's finding that McDaniels did not have a 
meaningful opportunity to respond cannot be squared with evidence 
indisputably showing that McDaniels in fact did respond to the 
charges. 
 We agree with the college that, in light of the 
undisputed evidence regarding the timing of the relevant events, 
the jury's conclusion that he was not given a meaningful 
opportunity to respond and to tell his side of the case cannot 
stand.  McDaniels received adequate notice of the nature of the 
  
November 27, 1991 meeting, and an explanation of the substance of 
the case against him.  Given this background, the time between 
his November 27 meeting with Bryan and McNicholas and the 
December 18 Board meeting was adequate as a matter of law for him 
to make an appropriate pretermination response.  Indeed, not only 
did Bryan and McNicholas ask for and receive McDaniels' responses 
during the November 27 meeting, but the correspondence shows that 
he was encouraged to respond further and did so.  In fact, 
Bryan's December 9, 1991 letter informed McDaniels that he could 
request a review prior to termination by the president of the 
college.  DeCosmo's actions in reading and answering McDaniels' 
letter showed that the college did not refuse him an opportunity 
to respond.5  Finally, the facts that McDaniels did respond to 
the charges during the pretermination meeting by essentially 
denying them and attributing the charges to Federici's emotional 
problems, and by writing to DeCosmo after the meeting, 
conclusively established that, contrary to the verdict, the 
college gave him a meaningful opportunity to respond and to tell 
his side of the story before termination.  Thus, if the jury's 
findings as to the first two questions are upheld, its third 
finding cannot stand.   
 In response to the college's arguments, McDaniels 
maintains that he did not receive timely and adequate notice, an 
adequate explanation of the specific allegations, or a meaningful 
                     
5
.  Of course, the fact that they did not accept his responses is 
irrelevant for purposes of determining whether his procedural due 
process rights were offended. 
  
opportunity to respond, though he does not ask that the verdicts 
adverse to him on the first two issues be set aside.  McDaniels 
contends that the notice given him was insufficient because it 
was not provided until the beginning of the pretermination 
meeting.  We have held, however, that "advance notice is not 
required."  Gniotek, 808 F.2d at 244.  In Copeland v. 
Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1142-46, we held that 
procedural due process was met where a policeman was told that he 
had tested positive for illegal drug use, was allowed to respond, 
and was told that he would be suspended with intent to dismiss, 
all in the course of a single interview. 
 Second, McDaniels contends that he did not receive 
adequate notice and explanation of the charges against him 
because he was not told or given the exact allegations made by 
Federici.  In this regard, it is not disputed that the written 
summary of Federici's allegations was not given or read to 
McDaniels before his termination.  We have held, however, that 
pretermination notice of the charges and evidence against an 
employee need not be in great detail as long as it allows the 
employee "the opportunity to determine what facts, if any, within 
his knowledge might be presented in mitigation of or in denial of 
the charges."  Gniotek, 808 F.2d at 244; see also Derstein v. 
Kansas, 915 F.2d 1410, 1413 (10th Cir. 1990) (fact that employee 
did not know of all relevant facts and was not given copy of 
investigation transcript is insignificant), cert. denied, 499 
U.S. 937, 111 S.Ct. 1391 (1991).  Nor is it disputed that Bryan 
asked McDaniels specific questions about Federici's allegations 
  
and that McDaniels replied to the questions.  The only dispute, 
then, is whether this session put McDaniels on sufficient notice 
of the charges against him so he could respond meaningfully and 
on this point the verdict is unassailable. 
 Thus, given that, for the reasons we already have 
stated, McDaniels received adequate notice and a sufficient 
explanation of the charges against him, it must be concluded that 
he also was given an adequate opportunity to respond.  McDaniels 
places great emphasis on his state of mind during the 
pretermination meeting.  In essence, he argues that by not giving 
him prior notice of the reason for the meeting, he was placed 
into a state of shock and was unable to respond when Bryan told 
him he was being charged with sexual harassment and might be 
terminated.  Though we do not decide the point, this contention 
might have been reasonable if he had been dismissed at the end of 
meeting, which only lasted about an hour.  See, e.g., Adams v. 
Sewell, 946 F.2d 757 (11th Cir. 1991).  But that was not the case 
here.  Several weeks elapsed between the pretermination meeting 
and the Board of Trustees' meeting at which he was terminated.  
Bryan informed him that he could appeal to DeCosmo, which he did.  
We need not determine today what amount of time for "cooling 
off," if any, must be allowed for an employee to respond to 
charges because the facts show that McDaniels had ample time to 
collect himself.6  Indeed, the record demonstrates that he 
                     
6
.  We are not holding that any delay beyond the pretermination 
hearing is required for a response.  Thus, this case does not 
cast doubt on the general practice reflected in the cases of 
  
consulted an attorney7 and sent a written response to DeCosmo 
before the December 18 meeting. 
 Derstein v. Kansas, 915 F.2d 1410, supports our 
conclusion that the elapse of time between the November 27 and 
the December 18 meetings requires that judgment as a matter of 
law be entered in favor of the college.  Indeed, Derstein is 
remarkably similar to this case on the facts.  In that case the 
public employer received information that a tenured employee was 
sexually harassing other employees.  As a result, he was directed 
to appear at a meeting with persons responsible for his 
employment.  He was not informed of the purpose of the meeting 
before it started but at the meeting he was advised of the sexual 
harassment charges and given ten days to resign or be terminated.  
He also was told he could appeal.  At the end of the ten days the 
employee was given a termination letter which described the 
appeal rights and which advised him of the charges against him.  
He appealed but the appeal board dismissed his appeal as 
frivolous.  Following a bench trial, the district court found 
that the employee's pretermination rights had been violated and 
thus it entered judgment for him.   
 The court of appeals reversed.  Of particular interest 
here, it emphasized that the employee "was not terminated at the 
(..continued) 
terminating an employee at the pretermination hearing.  Our 
opinion simply reflects what happened here. 
7
.  McDaniels testified that he talked to his union's attorney 
after the pretermination meeting.  App. 1095.  In addition, his 
letter to Cosmo indicated that he was withholding copies of the 
letter from Federici "on advice of attorney."  App. 2253. 
  
meeting but given ten days to respond" and "[h]e was given ten 
days before termination."  Id. at 1413.  McDaniels had even more 
time to respond than the employee in Derstein and he did respond 
after the November 27 meeting. 
 Finally, McDaniels argues that the district court 
should have granted him judgment as a matter of law because the 
college's termination procedure violated Pennsylvania Local 
Agency Law.  This argument flies in the face of both logic and 
law.  His complaint charged that the college violated McDaniels 
federal constitutional rights to procedural due process.  The 
question of whether an employee has a property right in continued 
employment is a question of state law.  Board of Regents of State 
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709.  But the 
determination of "'what process is due' . . . is not to be found 
in [state statutes]."  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541, 105 S.Ct. at 
1493 (citation omitted).  Rather, it is a question of federal 
constitutional law.  See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491, 100 
S.Ct. 1254, 1263 (1980) (minimum requirements of procedural due 
process are "a matter of federal law" and "are not diminished by 
the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures 
that it may deem adequate").  Purported violations of state law 
are not germane here. 
 In reaching our result we take note of Judge Aldisert's 
contentions in his dissent that the college denied McDaniels 
procedural due process of law.  He predicates this contention on 
his conclusions that the notice of the pretermination hearing was 
constitutionally inadequate and that McDaniels did not have an 
  
opportunity to prepare a meaningful defense to the charges.  
Judge Aldisert relies principally on Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 
364 (3d Cir. 1987), in reaching his conclusions. 
 Our opinion to this point adequately responds to Judge 
Aldisert's contentions except that we have not mentioned Morton 
v. Beyer which we thus now address.  In Morton v. Beyer at the 
pretermination hearing the employee was suspended without pay.  
822 F.2d at 366.  Thus, the proceedings at the hearing were 
critical because unless the employee's response then and there 
convinced the administrators not to take action, and it did not, 
the employee forthwith would suffer a serious adverse employment 
action.  Here, unlike the plaintiff in Morton v. Beyer, McDaniels 
does not allege that he was suspended without pay at the 
pretermination hearing.  Rather, his complaint is that the 
trustees unlawfully discharged him on December 18, 1991.  
Accordingly, McDaniels quite logically did not sue Bryan and 
McNicholas, he sued the trustees.  Therefore, Morton v. Beyer is 
completely distinguishable from this case and it is not 
controlling here. 
 
 B.  Preclusion from Showing that Pretermination 
 Hearing was a Sham 
 McDaniels also argues that the district court erred in 
refusing to allow him to show at trial that the pretermination 
procedure afforded him was a sham.  Essentially, McDaniels' 
theory is that the college administrators never believed 
Federici's allegations to be true.  Instead, he charges that they 
  
pounced on Federici's complaint to get rid of a highly paid 
professor to save money.  The district court, relying in part on 
a recent case from the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 
McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (in banc), cert. 
denied, 115 S.Ct. 898 (1995), ruled that even if proven, the fact 
that the proceedings were a sham would be irrelevant to the claim 
that pretermination procedural due process was denied because the 
sufficiency of post-termination protection was not at issue.  
App. 1005-10. 
 Although due process requires an impartial 
decisionmaker before final deprivation of a property interest, 
Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195, 102 S.Ct. 1665, 1670 
(1982), it is not clear that strict impartiality is required at 
each stage of the process.  In situations as the one at hand, 
there are two stages, pretermination and post-termination, but 
normally the post-termination proceedings conclusively determine 
the employee's status.  The pretermination hearing merely serves 
as "an initial check against mistaken decisions--essentially, a 
determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the charges against the employee are true and support the 
proposed action."  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46, 105 S.Ct. at 
1495 (citations omitted). 
 We have not decided the specific question of whether, 
in the employment termination context, an impartial decisionmaker 
is required at the pretermination hearing.  In Rosa v. Resolution 
Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383, 396-97 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 981, 112 S.Ct. 582 (1991), however, we touched upon a 
  
similar issue in another context.  Rosa involved a pension plan 
of a bank placed under the conservatorship of the Resolution 
Trust Corporation (the "RTC").  At first, the RTC decided to 
continue the plan and assumed payment obligations.  But after two 
contribution payments, the RTC decided to halt contributions and 
it sent out notices that the plan was to be terminated in two 
months.  The beneficiaries of the plan sued.  Under the Financial 
Institutions Reform and Recovery Enforcement Act, however, 
certain of the plaintiffs' claims for monetary relief had to be 
presented first to the RTC for review.  The plaintiffs argued 
that this claims procedure violated due process because the RTC 
was biased as it had a financial interest in the determination of 
their claims.  We held that the alleged bias did not violate due 
process because, after exhaustion of the RTC claims procedure, 
the plaintiffs would have the post-deprivation option of 
obtaining a de novo court evaluation of their claims.  938 F.2d 
at 397.  Our holding in Rosa is consistent with the approaches 
taken by other circuits in resolving this issue in the employment 
termination context. 
 In McKinney v. Pate, cited by the district court, a 
county official challenged the procedures of his termination, 
alleging that the Board of County Commissioners, who made the 
preliminary decision to terminate his employment, "was 
preordained to find against him, regardless of the evidence."  
McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1561.  The court of appeals in banc, stated 
that "[a] demonstration that the decisionmaker was biased . . . 
is not tantamount to a demonstration that there has been a denial 
  
of procedural due process."  McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1562.  The 
court reasoned that the employee was entitled also to a post-
termination hearing and would not be deprived of due process 
"unless and until the state refuses to provide due process."  Id.  
The court held: 
 [I]n the case of an employment termination 
case, 'due process [does not] require the 
state to provide an impartial decisionmaker 
at the pre-termination hearing.  The state is 
obligated only to make available "the means 
by which [the employee] can receive redress 
for the deprivations."'  Schaper v. City of 
Hunstville, 813 F.2d 709, 715-16 (5th Cir. 
1987) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 
527, 543, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1917, 68 L.Ed.2d 
420 (1981)) (footnote omitted). 
 
McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1562.  Other court of appeals have come to 
this same conclusion in cases where hearings are provided both 
before and after dismissal.  See, e.g., Walker v. City of 
Berkeley, 951 F.2d 182, 184 (9th Cir. 1991) ("failure to provide 
an impartial decisionmaker at the pretermination stage, of 
itself, does not create liability, so long as the decisionmaker 
at the post-termination hearing is impartial");  Duchesne v. 
Williams, 849 F.2d 1004, 1005 (6th Cir. 1988) (in banc) 
(Loudermill does not require a "neutral and impartial 
decisionmaker" at the pretermination hearing but only "a right of 
reply before the official responsible for the discharge"), cert. 
denied, 489 U.S. 1081, 109 S.Ct. 1535 (1989).  Likewise, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached the same 
conclusion via an application of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 
101 S.Ct. 1908 (1981), and held that even if allegations of bias 
  
and conspiracy on the part of the decisionmaker were true, "the 
state cannot be expected to anticipate such unauthorized and 
corrupt conduct."  Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 
714-16 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 We find these cases convincing.  First, as the Supreme 
Court has held, "[t]he constitutional [procedural due process] 
violation actionable under § 1983 is not complete when the 
deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State 
fails to provide due process."  Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 
126, 110 S.Ct. 975, 983 (1990).  The Zinermon Court held that 
part of the process that the State may offer to avoid 
constitutional violations is a remedy for erroneous deprivations.  
Id.  Thus, a discharged employee cannot claim in federal court 
that he has been denied due process because his pretermination 
hearing was held by a biased individual where he has not taken 
advantage of his right to a post-deprivation hearing before an 
impartial tribunal that can rectify any possible wrong committed 
by the initial decisionmaker. 
 We also find most persuasive the application of Parratt 
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, to claims that 
pretermination decisionmakers were not impartial.  In Parratt v. 
Taylor, a prisoner claimed violation of his procedural due 
process rights because the mail-ordered hobby kits for which he 
had paid disappeared after their delivery to his prison.  The 
Supreme Court first recognized that "either the necessity of 
quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any 
meaningful predeprivation process, when coupled with the 
  
availability of some meaningful means by which to assess the 
propriety of the State's action at some time after the initial 
taking, can satisfy the requirements of procedural due process."  
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 539, 101 S.Ct. at 1915 (footnote 
omitted).  The Court held that the prisoner failed to make out a 
procedural due process claim.  The Court reasoned that the nature 
of this deprivation, "a tortious loss [resulting from] a random 
and unauthorized act by a state employee," makes it difficult if 
not impossible for the State to hold a meaningful hearing before 
the deprivation.  Id. at 541, 101 S.Ct. at 1916.  The Court held 
that in such instances post-deprivation remedies such as tort 
laws are adequate. 
 This reasoning applies equally well in the employment 
termination context.  Usually, an employment termination decision 
is made initially by the employee's direct supervisor or someone 
working in the same organization as the employee -- a sensible 
approach given that such person often is already familiar with 
the employee's abilities and shortcomings as well as the needs 
and interests of the employer organization.  Yet, these 
individuals are also likely targets for claims of bias or 
improper motive simply because of their positions.  For example, 
personality discord may lead to charges that a direct supervisor 
was biased.  Or, as here, budget squeezes may lead to charges 
that the motivation for the dismissal was to trim the budget.  
While these charges may have merit in certain cases, to require 
that the state ensure an impartial pretermination hearing in 
every instance would as a practical matter require that 
  
termination decisions initially be made by an outside party 
rather than the employer as charges of bias always could be made 
following an in-house discharge.  Not only is this procedure 
unduly cumbersome, but it also may be unreasonably invasive for 
the employee, who may want to keep the circumstances of his 
discharge private.  On the whole, we do not think that such 
excessive pretermination precaution is necessary where the state 
provides a neutral tribunal at the post-termination stage that 
can resolve charges of improper motives. 
 Here, the parties agree that the college is a "local 
agency" subject to Pennsylvania Local Agency Law.8  Under 
sections 752 and 754 of the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 752 & 754 (Supp. 1994), McDaniels had the right to appeal 
the college's decision to the state court.  See Monaghan v. Board 
of Sch. Directors of Reading Sch. Dist., 618 A.2d 1239, 1241 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1992).  Under section 754, a court may hold a de novo 
hearing "[i]n the event a full and complete record of the 
proceedings before the local agency was not made."  Moreover, the 
court may modify or set aside an agency decision if it finds 
violations of the employee's constitutional rights, an error of 
law, or that necessary findings of fact were not supported by 
substantial evidence.  Id.; see also Coyle v. Middle Bucks Area 
Vocational Technical Sch., 654 A.2d 15, 16 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994); 
Springfield Sch. Dist. v. Shellem, 328 A.2d 535, 537-38 (Pa. 
                     
8
.  Pennsylvania statute defines "local agency" as "[a] 
government agency other than a Commonwealth agency."  2 Pa. Ann. 
Stat. Ann. § 101 (Supp. 1994). 
  
Commw. Ct. 1974).  Clearly then, even aside from McDaniels' 
options in his union contract, which procedures he in fact 
initiated, the state offered him sufficient process to protect 
his property rights. 
 
 C.  Denial of New Trial on Non-Economic Damages 
 As we find that the college did not violate McDaniels' 
procedural due process rights, we need not reach the question 
raised on his cross-appeal as to whether the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for a new trial on non-economic damages. 
 
 D.  Dismissal of Individual Defendants 
 In a memorandum opinion, the district court noted that 
it had dismissed, sua sponte and without objection, the case as 
to the individual defendants because they had nothing to do with 
the pretermination events leading to McDaniels' discharge.  There 
has been some confusion as to the resolution of this issue 
because McDaniels states that he did not agree to the dismissal 
and an order of dismissal was not entered until June 28, 1994, 
which was several months after the dismissal at the aborted 
trial.  When the case was retried, McDaniels' attorney brought up 
this point and the court adhered to its ruling.  App. 703-04.  In 
his cross-appeal, McDaniels challenges this dismissal. 
 We exercise plenary review over the district court's 
dismissal of the individual defendants.  Alnor Check Cashing v. 
Katz, 11 F.3d 27, 29 (3d Cir. 1993).  We have some question as to 
whether the district court's reasoning was correct as the 
  
trustees actually terminated McDaniels' employment.  However, in 
light of our conclusion that the college did not violate 
McDaniels' rights to procedural due process, we will affirm the 
dismissal of the individual defendants.  Inasmuch as the 
pretermination procedures did not violate McDaniels' rights, the 
individual defendants could not be liable. 
 
 V.  CONCLUSION 
 For the above reasons, we will reverse the order 
denying the college's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter 
of law and will affirm the trial court's dismissal of the case as 
to the individual defendants.  We do not address the college's 
appeal from the order denying its motion made at the end of the 
McDaniels' case for a judgment as a matter of law as it is moot.  
In sum, the consequence of our opinion is that this litigation is 
terminated in the federal courts with judgments in favor of all 
the defendants. 
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ALDISERT, Circuit Judge, Dissenting 
 
 Fundamental fairness is the hallmark of the procedural 
protections afforded by the Due Process Clause.  Here we must 
decide whether the pretermination procedures of Delaware County 
Community College comported with the requirements of due process.  
  
In my view they did not.  I would affirm the judgment of the 
district court.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
 Prior to termination, a public employee with a property 
interest in continued employment must be afforded "a 
pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with post-
termination administrative [or judicial] procedures."  Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1985).  To 
ensure that the pretermination hearing is a meaningful one, the 
employee "is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges 
against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an 
opportunity to present his side of the story."  Id. at 546. 
 In this case, Professor McDaniels was not provided 
adequate notice of the subject or purpose of the November 27, 
1991 meeting.  He was told only that he should bring his current 
gradebook and that it related to "a student problem."  App. Vol. 
II at 790-91, 868-70.  To be sure, advance notice is not a per se 
requirement of due process.  Gniotek v. City of Philadelphia, 808 
F.2d 242, 244 (3d Cir. 1986).  Rather, as the majority correctly 
noted, "[n]otice is sufficient, 1) if it apprises the vulnerable 
party of the nature of the charges and general evidence against 
him, and 2) if it is timely under the particular circumstances of 
the case."  Id. at 244.  Thus, although advance notice is not 
required, "'the timing and content of notice ... will depend on 
appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved.'"  
Id. (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975)).  I 
conclude that the "particular circumstances" in this case 
  
required some form of advance notice.  See Morton v. Beyer, 822 
F.2d 364, 369 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 In Morton v. Beyer, a corrections sergeant at a state 
prison was summoned to a pretermination hearing six months after 
the putative misconduct, in that case inmate abuse, although he 
was aware that an internal affairs investigation was initiated 
within a couple of days of the alleged incident.  On the morning 
of the hearing, the public employee received "vague" notice that 
the upcoming hearing had something to do with "a general 
allegation of inmate abuse."  822 F.2d at 370.  At the hearing 
itself, the employee was accompanied by his union representative 
and was provided a packet of materials containing the various 
investigative reports of the incident for his review and comment, 
to which the employee declined to respond at the advice of his 
representative.  We concluded:  "On the undisputed facts of this 
case, [the employee] was not afforded timely notice of the nature 
of the charges or the general evidence against him."  Id. at 371. 
 This case assumes a fortiori proportions.  First, 
although Professor McDaniels also was summoned months after the 
alleged incident, he was never aware that he was being 
investigated at any time prior to the pretermination hearing.  
Second, McDaniels received notice more vague than that in Morton 
v. Beyer:  He was told less than two hours before the meeting 
only that he should bring his current gradebook and that it 
related to "a student problem."  App. Vol. II at 790-91, 868-70.  
He was not informed that the upcoming meeting was intended to 
serve as a pretermination hearing or that it related to a student 
  
complaint of sexual harassment.  Amazingly, this lack of notice 
was in keeping with the college's policy that the more serious 
the alleged incident, the less notice and information is 
provided.  App. Vol. II at 802-03.  Third, unlike the public 
employee in Morton v. Beyer, McDaniels was not accompanied by a 
representative and was not afforded the opportunity to review the 
investigative report or evidence against him, specifically a 
three-page hand-written summary composed by Bryan and signed by 
the complaining student.  Fourth, as part of the pretermination 
procedure the employee in Morton v. Beyer was provided a 
departmental hearing after the initial hearing, 822 F.2d at 367 
n.1 & n.2, whereas Professor McDaniels, notwithstanding the 
availability of what the majority characterize as "post-
termination rights," was refused further pretermination review or 
investigation when, at the suggestion of Bryan, he filed a 
written request for this additional safeguard from the president 
of the college.   
 Although I am satisfied that McDaniels' pretermination 
hearing afforded him, to some degree, an impromptu opportunity to 
hear some of the college's evidence and present his side of the 
story, clearly he was unable to mount a defense equivalent to the 
studied and prepared presentation levelled against him:    
 In affirming the conclusion of the district 
court that [McDaniels] likely received an 
inadequate Loudermill hearing, we emphasize 
that we simply hold that, on the facts of 
this case, prior notice of the nature of the 
charges against [McDaniels] was required.  
Particularly in light of the significant 
lapse in time between the alleged improper 
conduct and the hearing in [Bryan's] office, 
  
[McDaniels] should have been provided 
sufficient time, at the very least, to 
recount the facts in his own mind and thus to 
prepare himself to demonstrate to [Bryan and 
McNicholas] that reasonable grounds to 
believe that the charges were true did not 
exist.   
 
Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d at 371 n. 11. 
 
 The majority and I seem to agree that it is difficult 
to square the jury's finding that Professor McDaniels was 
afforded constitutionally adequate notice of the pretermination 
hearing and the charges against him with its finding that he was 
not afforded a constitutionally adequate opportunity to respond.  
With such an agreement is an implicit acknowledgement that notice 
and opportunity to be heard are inextricably bound. 
 Subsumed in the due process requirement of notice is 
the concept that the recipient will be afforded some opportunity 
to prepare a meaningful defense.  In this case the fact that 
notice of the pretermination meeting was given, as found by the 
jury, was nevertheless insufficient to permit Professor McDaniels 
to defend against a serious charge of sexual harassment 
intentionally flung upon him out of the blue, as also found by 
the jury.  Under my view of due process protection, notice of a 
meeting is meaningless unless the vulnerable party is permitted a 
realistic opportunity to mount a defense and respond accordingly. 
 To be sure, the jury found that Professor McDaniels 
received notice of the meeting.  That is a question of fact which 
I will not disturb on review.  As a matter of constitutional law, 
however, I believe that the notice failed to meet the 
  
constitutional requirements of procedural due process.  That is a 
question for the court and not for the jury.   
 Accordingly, I dissent.  
